Local firms in their home countries often engage in behavior that constitutes corrup-tion, at least through some cultural lenses. One such practice is bribery of public officials. This study uses multilevel theory to address the question of why bribery activity of this type differs among countries.
We analyze responses from nearly 4,000 firms worldwide using hierarchical linear modeling to investigate cross-level predic-tions about bribery. Drawing from anomie theory, we find support for country-level cultural and institutional drivers of firm-level bribery. We extend anomie theory by showing how firm-level pressures can encourage the supplying of bribes as a firm strategy
We analyze responses from nearly 4,000 firms worldwide using hierarchical linear modeling to investigate cross-level predic-tions about bribery. Drawing from anomie theory, we find support for country-level cultural and institutional drivers of firm-level bribery. We extend anomie theory by showing how firm-level pressures can encourage the supplying of bribes as a firm strategy
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